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Civil Contempt and Congressional
Interference in the Case of Morgan v.
Foretich
I. Introduction
Dr. Elizabeth Morgan spent twenty-five months in the District

of Columbia Detention Center after superior court Judge Herbert
Dixon found Morgan to be in civil contempt for refusing to comply
with a court ordered visitation schedule.1 The visitation schedule
called for Morgan's daughter Hilary, then five years old, to have unsupervised visits with her natural father, Dr. Eric Foretich, whom
Morgan claims sexually abused the child.' Foretich steadfastly denied the charges.' Instead of turning the child over to Foretich, Morgan sent Hilary into hiding.4 Morgan was freed in September, 1989
only after unusual intervention by Congress.'
Amassing thousands of pages of testimony, requiring scores of
witnesses, and accumulating costs in the millions of dollars, the acrimonious and bitter case of Morgan v. Foretich6 became the largest
and most expensive judicial proceeding ever brought in the District
of Columbia court system.7 More significantly, the Morgan case
1. Washington Post, Sept. 24, 1989, at DI, col. 1.
2. Boston Globe, July 16, 1989, (Magazine), at 16,
col. 2.
3. Id. Foretich acknowledges that the child has been sexually abused but claims that
Morgan is the abuser.
4. Morgan convinced her estranged, elderly parents to reunite and flee with the child.
Foretich hired private investigators who, in February 1990, located Hilary in Christchurch,
New Zealand. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1990, at A20, col. 1. In November 1990, a New Zealand judge awarded custody to Morgan, provided that Morgan remain with her daughter in
New Zealand. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1990, at AIO, col. I. Foretich has indicated that he will
not pursue the case further. Id. For an in-depth account of how the case of Morgan v. Foretich
came into being, and the personalities behind the case, see The Boston Globe, July 16, 1989,
(Magazine), at 16, col. I. See also N.Y. Times, May 21, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, col. I.
5. See infra notes 139-85 and accompanying text.
6. To date, there have been four District of Columbia Court of Appeals decisions: Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan I), 521 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1987); Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan II), 528
A.2d 425 (D.C. 1987); Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan 111), 546 A.2d 407 (D.C. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d I (D.C. 1989).
Morgan also brought an action against Foretich and his elderly parents for damages arising out of the Foretichs' alleged sexual abuse of Hilary. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941
(4th Cir. 1988). Morgan's claim for damages was denied by the jury as was Foretich's counterclaims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 942. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case holding that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding evidence that Hilary's sister had been abused by Foretich
and excluding out of court statements made by Hilary. Id.
7. Boston Globe, July 16, 1989, (Magazine), at 28,
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brought the topic of civil contempt and calls for its reform to the
forefront of the national media, the courts, and Congress.
In the most general sense, civil contempt is a coercive measure,
designed to force a recalcitrant party to comply with a court order. 8

In contrast, criminal contempt is designed to punish a party for not
complying with a court order. 9 The distinction between the two is
important: if a party is being punished for criminal contempt, then
the constitutional safeguards of a criminal trial apply."0 The same
does not hold true for civil contempt proceedings. 1 At some point,
however, an imprisoned civil contemnor may be able to show that

there is no substantial likelihood that continued confinement will accomplish its coercive purpose, and hence, that confinement has become unconstitutionally punitive. 2 In such a situation, the civil contemnor must be released. It is an ironic paradox: the same defiance

that put a contumacious party in jail offers the best hope of release.
The individual, however, is still subject to prosecution for criminal
contempt, and any-other applicable criminal violations.'"
Most people never test the outer limits of confinement under

civil contempt, either because they submit to the court's authority or
because their case becomes moot." Such was not the case with Dr.
Morgan. The procedural history of the case is long and complex and
much of the transcript was kept secret under court order.' After
twenty-three months of confinement, Morgan argued and lost in the
trial court, and stressed again on appeal that her continued confinement had lost its coercive effect and became punitive because there
was no realistic possibility that further confinement would induce
col. 3.
8. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 93 (1973). See also infra notes 3564 and accompanying text.
9. See D. DOBBs, supra note 8, at 93. See also infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
12. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 424-25 (3d Cir. 1979).
13. In addition to the possibility of being prosecuted for criminal contempt, Morgan's
role in hiding her daughter may have amounted to a violation of the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1985, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1021-1026 (1988 Supp.), or its federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982).
14. Over ninety-nine percent of civil contemnors relent to the court's authority. The National Law Journal, Oct. 30, 1989, at 42, col. 3. In a situation similar to Morgan's, Karen
Newsom claimed her ex-husband had abused their daughter. The court, however, ruled against
her and awarded custody to the father. Newsome sent the child into hiding and was imprisoned for civil contempt. After a little over a month in jail, Newsome relented and revealed the
location of the child. She was then released. Wilkinson, Witch-Hunting in Hattiesburg, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER, May, 1988, at 105.
15. For a detailed history of the case, see cases cited in note 6, supra.
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compliance. 16 The Court of Appeals agreed with Morgan and ordered her release.1" Unfortunately for Dr. Morgan, her release was
not forthcoming. The full Court of Appeals immediately vacated the
opinion and ordered the case to be scheduled for a rehearing en
banc.' 8
Morgan's eventual release from the Detention Center was not
the result of judicial action. Instead, Morgan's imprisonment came
to an end in September of 1989 when Congress, in a virtually unprecedented move,' 9 passed the District of Columbia Civil Contempt
Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989,20 a law closely tailored to alleviating Morgan's predicament. The Act amended the District of
Columbia Code2 and limited to twelve months the length of time a
person can be imprisoned for civil contempt in the District.2 2 The
law affected only child custody cases2" and, in order to free Dr. Morgan, was written to apply retroactively. 2 ' The law enraged many
judges who saw it as a direct encroachment on the powers of the
judiciary.25 Just as troubling to many was the fact that passage of
the law came at a time when Morgan's case was still pending in the
courts - as the law was being debated on Capitol Hill, the en banc
Court of Appeals was hearing oral arguments on the fate of Dr.
Morgan.
Professor Robert Martineau postulates that problems with civil
contempt "ebb and flow" with problems in society.26 Elizabeth Morgan's situation is certainly not unique. 27 The number of reports of
16. Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d 1, 1-2 (D.C. 1989). In the trial court,
after sixteen months of incarceration, Judge Dixon declared that "coercion had just begun."
Id. at 9.
17. Id.at 2.
18. Id.at 1.
19. See Washington Post, Sept. 24, 1989, at DI,
col. 1.
20. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
21. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-944, 11-721 (1981).
22. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
23. Id.
24. Id. The Act was also written in a fashion that made it effective for only eighteen
months. Id.
25. Speaking anonymously, one judge called the new law "a terrible and dangerous precedent." Another declared that "[t]he judicial branch had concluded that Dr. Morgan should
be in custody . . . and the proper progression of that issue was disrupted by a political lobbying campaign and this legislation. As a judge, but even as a citizen who can stand back and
look at this thing, I think it is frightening." Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at CI,
col. 1.
26. The National Law Journal, Oct. 30, 1989, at 42, col. 2.
27. See, e.g., Schotz v. Oliver, 361 So. 2d 605 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (mother imprisoned on contempt charge for not allowing visitation with father); Casbergue v. Casbergue, 335
N.W.2d 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (similar to Schotz); Marallo v. Marallo, 128 A.D.2d 710,
513 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1987) (mother imprisoned on civil contempt charge for not allowing visita-
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alleged sexual abuse in custody cases has grown steadily.28 Many
parents, however, distrust the judicial system because of the difficulty of proving the abuse in court.2 9 The courts' use of civil contempt is now being reevaluated in light of the Morgan case, with an
increasing number of calls for reform.30
This Comment will explain how courts have traditionally made
a distinction between civil and criminal contempt and the importance of the distinction. 1 Section III narrows the focus and examines how courts have determined when the coercive nature of civil
contempt ends and punishment begins. 32 Section IV addresses Congress's approach to the issue, and includes a critical analysis of the
District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation
Act.33 Finally, section V proposes solutions that strike a balance between the court's ability to enforce its decrees and the rights of civil
contemnors, without placing a cap on the time a person may be imprisoned for civil contempt. "
II.

Civil and Criminal Contempt

The ability to hold someone in contempt is a venerable power,
one that has long been considered an inherent power of the judicial
branch.35 The contempt power dates back to the early days of England,36 and in its earliest form was sometimes used to effectuate bartion with grandparents); Young v. Young, 129 A.D.2d 794, 514 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1987) (father
imprisoned on civil contempt charge for not giving custody of child to mother); People v. Warden, 46 A.D.2d 256, 362 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1974), affd, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913; King v. Department
of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 738 P.2d 1303 (1988) (father imprisoned for
contempt in refusing to disclose location of child).
28. According to the American Humane Association, there were 6,000 confirmed reports
of child sexual abuse in 1976. By 1986, the number had risen to 132,000. New York Times,
May 21, 1989, at 90, col. 2.
In most courts, approximately two percent to ten percent of all family court cases involv-

ing custody and/or visitation disputes also involve a charge of sexual abuse. SEXUAL ABUSE
ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 4 (E. Nicholson ed. 1988).
29. All but the most flagrant cases of sexual abuse are difficult to validate. SEXUAL
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES, 53-54 (E. Nicholson ed. 1988).
30. The original sponsor of the House Bill amending the District's law on civil contempt,
Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.), expressed an intention to write to the Governors of each
state encouraging them to enact similar legislation. 135 CONG. REC. H5843 (daily ed. Sept.

21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Wolf).
31.
32.
33.

See infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 65-138 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.

34. See infra § V.
35. See Ex parte Robinson, 19 U.S. 505, 510 (1873); see also, Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (contempt is a power "absolutely essential" for the functioning of an

independent judiciary).
36.

R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 9 (1963).
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baric results.8 7 Although the authority to hold someone in contempt

has been exercised in the United States since the birth of our judicial
system, courts have traditionally had much difficulty distinguishing
the two types of contempt.38 The distinction is important from the
viewpoint of the contemnor because the labelling of contempt as civil

or criminal determines the amount of due process protections available in any contempt proceedings. An alleged criminal contemnor is
entitled to an unbiased judge,"9 a presumption of innocence until

found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,40 a right against self-in-

crimination, i notice of the charge, 2 time to prepare a defense,'4 and
the right to call witnesses."" An alleged criminal contemnor also has
the right to be represented by effective counsel. 4" To many, one of
the most important features of a criminal contempt proceeding is the
right to a jury trial if the sentence is to be imprisonment for more
than six months.' 6 In contrast to the protections afforded an alleged
criminal contemnor, due process in a civil contempt hearing merely
requires that the party be given notice and a hearing.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the problem of distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt in Gompers v.
Bucks Stove and Range Co. 4 8 The Gompers Court attempted to establish a definitive test for distinguishing between civil and criminal
contempt. This attempt, however, actually created confusion in the

lower courts.' 9 Nevertheless, courts have frequently used the criteria
established in Gompers to determine when a contempt is civil or
criminal. The Court held that
37. In 1631 at the Salisbury assizes, a defendant, miffed at the sentence imposed upon
him, threw a brickbat at the judge, narrowly missing him. For this, the defendant's hand was
cut off and fixed to a gibbet. He was then immediately hanged in the presence of the court. (A
"brickbat" is defined as a fragment of a hard material (such as a brick), or an uncomplimentary remark. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 137 (1st ed. 1973); a "gibbet" is
defined as a gallows, or an upright post with a projecting arm for hanging the bodies of executed criminals as a warning. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 484 (lst ed. 1973)).
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 187 (1971).
38. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 36, at 31.
39. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955).
40.
41.

42.
criminal
43.
44.
45.
46.
(1966).
47.

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).

Id.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) for requirement that notice and a hearing be given in a
contempt case.
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
Id.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948).
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373
See Dobbs, supra note 37, at 243.

48. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
49. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 36, at 57.
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[i]t is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and
purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes
of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial
and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal
contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of
50
the court.
Hence, courts have often focused on the purpose of the punishment.
If a sentence is intended to coerce a recalcitrant party to comply
with a court order, it is remedial and therefore a civil contempt. If
the sentence is intended to punish a party for not complying with a
court order, the contempt is criminal.
Half a century after Gompers, the Supreme Court stated the
test in the form of a question: "what does the court primarily seek to
accomplish by imposing sentence?" 51 Unfortunately, as pointed out
in Gompers, a problem with formulating a test around the purpose
of the punishment is that in most cases, the sentence imposed has
incidental effects.52 For example, if the court imprisons a contumacious party in order to force compliance with its order, the court also
vindicates its authority.5 3 If a sentence is for purposes of criminal
punishment, the complainant may also receive some benefit from the
fact that the punishment may prevent a repetition of the
disobedience."
The Gompers Court identified an additional factor to be taken
into account for purposes of distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt: who initiated the proceeding.55 Proceedings for civil
contempt are between the original parties, whereas criminal contempt proceedings are between the public and the alleged contemnor, and usually initiated by a prosecutor."
The Gompers Court recognized still another distinguishing feature between the two types of contempt. The Court stated:
The distinction between refusing to do an act commanded,
remedied by imprisonment until the party performs the required
50. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
51. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
52. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
53. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911). Goldfarb postulates that in all cases, the primary purpose behind the contempt power is to assert power by
government over interfering individuals. Even in civil contempt cases, "there is an exaltation of
government and a strengthening of its control and power through the judicial process." R.

supra note 36, at
54. Gompers, 221 -U.S.
55. Id. at 444-45.
56. Id. See also United
tempt initiated by a party to
GOLDFARB,

57.
at 443.
States v. Russoti, 446 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir. 1984) (civil conthe underlying proceeding).
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act; and doing an act forbidden, - punished by imprisonment
for a definite term; is sound in principle, and generally, if not
universally, affords a test by which to determine the character of
the punishment."7
This concept, related to the purpose test, focuses on the type of sentence imposed. In this sense, criminal contempt is characterized by a
fixed, or determinate sentence, whereas civil contempt is characterized by an open, or indefinite sentence compelling the civil contemnor to be imprisoned until the court order is obeyed.
The Supreme Court, in Hicks v. Feiock,5 8 decisively adopted
the objective test hinted at in Gompers to distinguish between civil
and criminal contempt. Retreating from the "purpose of the punishment" test, the majority reasoned that "this Court has never undertaken to psychoanalyze the subjective intent of a State's laws and its
courts, not only because that effort would be unseemly and improper,
' Instead, the proper way
but also because it would be misguided." 59
to analyze the issue is to simply examine the sentence imposed.6 0 If
the sentence is determinate (such as one year imprisonment), the
contempt is classified as criminal. 61 But if the sentence is indeterminate, thereby holding the party in contempt until compliance, the
contempt is civil. 62
An objective test is well suited for appellate courts because the
sentence is examined retrospectively. This type of test, however, can
also be easily applied at the trial level by simply requiring the trial
judge to determine beforehand what type of sentence is to be imposed and then to follow the applicable procedures.6 3 It seems that
the Supreme Court has wisely adopted Professor Dobbs's proposal of
nearly two decades earlier that "[i]t is enough to say that a determinate ('criminal') sentence cannot be meted out where criminal-type
protections are not afforded in the procedure. It is not necessary to
57. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
58. 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
59. Id. at 633. The court seems to be somewhat ignorant of its prior decisions that have
in fact looked to the subjective intent of lower courts, in other words, the purpose of the sentence. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (the character and purpose of
the punishment is a factor in distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (same).
60. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 633.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Note, Modern Discussion of a Venerable Power: Civil Versus Criminal Contempt and Its Role in Child Support Enforcement: Hicks v. Feiock, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV.

163, 188 (1988).

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1991

say more.""
III.

When Coercion Ends and Punishment Begins

Courts have rationalized their ability to hold civil contemnors in
jail for extended periods without the due process protections accorded criminal contemnors by relying on the legal cliche that civil
contemnors "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." 6 5
Thus, civil contemnors have the ability to control their release by
simply complying with the court order. It follows logically that because it is impossible to coerce someone to do something beyond
their power to perform, a civil contemnor must be released if he no
longer has the ability to comply with the court's mandate."
A problem arises if an individual, such as Dr. Morgan, has the
ability to comply, but because of steadfast moral, religious, or ethical
principles, adamantly refuses to comply. In such a case it may be
likely that no amount of coercion will force that person to relent. It
is clear that a civil contempt incarceration cannot last forever,
thereby becoming a de facto sentence of life imprisonment. 67 The
task of determining exactly how long a civil contemnor may be incarcerated, however, is all too often a perplexing one at best." Given
the notion that civil contempt is remedial and coercive, 69 the legal
justification for incarceration ends when it becomes clear that the
incarceration has lost its coercive power. When it is clear that civil
contempt sanctions are fruitless, they lose their remedial characteristics and become more punitive. The contemnor must then be released because of the notion that criminal penalties may not be imposed in civil contempt proceedings. 70 This was precisely the issue
raised by Dr. Morgan in Morgan IV." Morgan argued that contin64. Dobbs, supra note 37, at 246.
65. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). Professor Goldfarb criticizes this oft
repeated expression as having a "clear absence of realism" because incarcerating a person
until an order is complied with is as much a punishment for refusing to do an act as it is a
coercion to perform it in the future. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 36, at 59-60.
66. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948). See also Shillitani v. United States, 384
U.S. 364 (1966) (when grand jury has been discharged, the rationale for holding a recalcitrant
witness has ended and the witness must be released).
67. See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Thornton, 560 F.
Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793,
738 P.2d 1303 (1988). See also Catena v. Seidl, 65 N.J. 256, 259, 321 A.2d 225, 228 (1974)
("It is abhorant to our concept of personal freedom that the process of civil contempt can be
used to jail a person indefinitely, possibly for life, even though he or she refuses to comply with
a court's order.").
68. See infra notes 88-114 and accompanying text.

69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70.
71.

In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1979).
564 A.2d I (D.C. 1989).
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ued confinement violated her right to due process because it had become clear that further incarceration would not coerce her into revealing the whereabouts of her child. She claimed, therefore, that
the character of her contempt conviction changed from remedial to
punitive."
The fairly recent practice of courts to review civil contempt orders to determine whether incarceration has lost its coercive effect
has primarily been in the context of recalcitrant witnesses who refuse to testify before a grand jury.78 The principle has, however,
been applied to other cases that resemble the situation faced by Dr.
Morgan. 4
A. Due Process Concerns
In concluding that a civil contemnor must be released when
confinement has lost its coercive force, some courts have addressed
the problem without considering potential constitutional issues.
Some courts have considered possible eighth amendment problems of
cruel and unusual punishment.7 " Most courts, however, base their
decision on due process concerns.7
Those courts raising due process concerns reason that when confinement has lost it coercive force and consequently no longer bears a
reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the contemnor was
imprisoned, due process requires that person's release.78 This concept
is based on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Jackson v.
Indiana.7 9 In Jackson, the defendant in a robbery trial lacked sufficient comprehension to stand trial and was committed to a mental
72.
73.

id. at 1-2.
See, e.g., In re Parrish, 782 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Dickinson, 763 F.2d 84

(2d Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1985); In re
Crededio, 759 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985); Sanchez v. United States, 725 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1984); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Braun), 600 F.2d 420 (3rd Cir. 1979); In re Papadakis, 613 F. Supp. 109 (D.C. III. 1985); In
re Thornton, 560 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. N.Y. 1983); In re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. N.Y.
1983); United States v. Dien, 598 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1979).
74. See, e.g. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 756 P.2d
1303 (1988) (father imprisoned for not revealing whereabouts of child.)
75. Id. See also Catena v. Seidl (Catena I), 65 N.J. 756, 321 A.2d 225 (1974); Catena
v. Seidl (Catena I1), 68 N.J. 224, 343 A.2d 744 (1975).
76. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
77. Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Braun), 600 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1979); Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1976); In
re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d I
(D.C. 1989).
78. See, e.g., Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d at 424-25; Lambert 545 F.2d

at 89-90.
79. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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institution until the Department of Mental Health deemed him
sane.80 A court appointed doctor testified that Jackson might never
be competent because he lacked sufficient intelligence to develop
communication skills.81 Defense counsel argued that Jackson's commitment amounted to a life sentence without ever being convicted of
a crime.8 2 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that "[a]t the least,
due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual
is committed." 88
Although the due process test is easily formulated, the point at
which imprisonment actually ceases to be coercive is not readily discernable.8 4 Judge Posner once stated:
We should keep a bright line between civil and criminal contempt. Putting a person in prison for up to eighteen months [the
maximum period of incarceration on civil contempt for witnesses
refusing to testify before a federal grand jury88 ] . . . without a
full trial, and with none of the safeguards of the criminal process . . . is an anomaly in our system .... 86
Although such a bright line is certainly desirable to protect the due
process rights of civil contemnors, it is unfortunately an impossible
task to formulate one. To determine when coercion ends, courts utilize the "substantial likelihood" test. Under this test, the contemnor
must be released if there is no substantial likelihood that continued
confinement will accomplish its coercive purpose.8 " The nature of the
test reveals that it is difficult to apply and especially daunting for the
trial court judge who must necessarily make a prediction into the
future on the effects of further incarceration on each individual contemnor. The judge is faced with the unenvious task of having to look
into the future to gauge, not what will happen, but the prospect that
something will happen.88 The task becomes even more difficult for
appellate court judges who are not in the position to observe the con80.

Id. at 719.

81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 738.

84.
85.
86.

See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1979).
See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).

87.

Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C. 1989); Lambert v. Mon-

tana, 545 F.2d 87, 87 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 577, 111 Cal. Rptr.
649, 649 (1974). Some courts have stated the test as being whether a civil contempt sanction
has lost any "realistic possibility" of having a coercive effect. Simkin v. United States, 715
F.2d at 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983). The difference is semantic only.
88. In re Parrish, 782 F.2d at 325, 327 (2d Cir. 1986).
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temnor testify.
B.

Time

The mere passage of time clearly does not transform coercion
into punishment. 89 In King v. Department of Social and Health Services,90 Sarah King filed a complaint with Child Protective Services
alleging that her husband had violently abused their two young children, J. and L.9" Mrs. King later recanted the allegation, which was
made when she was in the psychiatric ward of a hospital. 91 The circumstance giving rise to the allegation was the death of L., who had
allegedly been trapped between a mattress and a wall. 93 As a result
of Mrs. King's allegation, both parents were ordered to bring J. to a
dependency hearing. 94 The Kings refused, and as a result, both were
imprisoned on civil contempt charges.90 Mrs. King, however, was released shortly after her confinement because she did not know where
J. was located.96 After eleven months of imprisonment, Mr. King
still refused to reveal the location of the child. The Washington
Court of Appeals held that the court's attempt to coerce King to
disclose the location of the child had become secondary to the punitive nature of the contempt.97 The court concluded that as a matter
of law, Mr. King's confinement had become punitive. 98 The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mere passage of
time does not transform coercive contempt into punitive contempt. 99
Instead, the issue must be addressed on a case by case basis "after a
conscientious consideration of the circumstances pertinent to the individual contemnor . .

..

oo

89. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 794, 756 P.2d
1303, 1309 (1988).
90. 47 Wash. App. 816, 738 P.2d 289 (1987), rev'd, I10 Wash. 2d 793, 756 P.2d 1303
(1988).

91.

Id. at 818, 738 P.2d at 290.
Id.
Id.
94. Id. at 819, 738 P.2d 289, 290-91.
95. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 47 Wash. App. 816, 820, 738 P.2d
289, 290-91 (1987).
96. Id. at 820, 738 P.2d at 291.
97. Id. at 826, 738 P.2d at 294.
98. Id.
99. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 100 Wash. 2d 793, 799, 756 P.2d
1303, 1309 (1988).
100. Id. at 799, 756 P.2d at 1309-10 (quoting Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d
92.
93.

Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added). In Simkin, the court reversed the district judge's ruling that
Simkin's incarceration had become punitive because the judge did not make an individualized
assessment. The district judge discounted Simkin's testimony that he would never comply and
stated, "It is not his case that I am worried about. He is only one case. It is another hundred
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C. Factors Considered by Judges

Judges consider various factors when they hear motions for the
release of civil contemnors. The testimony of the individual imprisoned for contempt is the most basic and obvious factor. Of course, a
judge need not accept as conclusive a contemnor's avowed intention
never to testify.101 The purpose of civil contempt would obviously be
eviscerated if all contemnors could gain release by simply stating
they will never comply. Even if a contemnor had an honestly held
belief that he or she would not comply, that attitude might be al-

tered by continued confinement. 10 2 Although a judge need not accept
such testimony, that does not mean that it may not be considered; a
contemnor does not have to present any more evidence than his or
her own testimony. 0 Indeed, many times that is all the judge may
have to consider. 0
Judges also consider the contemnor's age and state of health, as

well as the length of confinement. 05 Some members of the bench
have turned the argument around and reason that age and health do
not necessarily detract from, but instead may actually increase, the
coercive effect of imprisonment.' 0 6 As age increases and health deteriorates, the desire to be free may become stronger.

The court in King held that one factor to be considered in deciding whether a civil contemnor should be released is the significance
of the ends to be achieved. 0 7 Courts could then balance their interests in enforcing compliance with a particular order against the contemnor's liberty.'0 " In King, this factor militated against King's recases I may get on civil contempt.
...
Simkin, 715 F.2d at 39. Thus, a judge should not
take into account any possible problems in the future with civil contempt cases, but instead
must look at the particular facts of each case. Cf. In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 585, 592 (7th Cir.
1985) (district court's concern that releasing Crededio would undermine the civil contempt
sanction is a valid factor that may be considered).
101. Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1989); Simkin 715 F.2d at
37; In re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp. 179, 180 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
102. See In re Parrish, 782 F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1986). See also supra note 14.
103. Sanchez v. United States, 725 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984). Of course, from a practical standpoint it would be helpful to present other witnesses whose testimony the hearing judge
could consider. For instance, in one of Dr. Morgan's hearings before Judge Dixon, Morgan
presented statements from Hilary and opinions of lay persons and professionals who had contact with Hilary to show Morgan's undying belief that Hilary was sexually abused, and that
Morgan would never hand the child over to Foretich. Morgan's priest, her psychiatrist, and her
fiancee (now husband), The Honorable Paul Michel, all testified about Morgan's resolution to
stay in jail as long as she believed necessary to protect the child. Morgan IV, 564 A.2d at 3.
104. Sanchez, 725 F.2d at 31.
105. Catena v. Seidl (Catena 11),
68 N.J. 224, 227, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975).
106. Id. at 230, 343 A.2d at 750-51 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
107. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 793, 800, 756 P.2d 1303,
1310 (1988).
108. Id.
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lease because the court reasoned that the physical safety and wellbeing of the missing child might be endangered by King's continued
defiance in not divulging the location of the child. 10 9 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Morgan IV was critical of the use of
such a factor and declined to follow the Washington court." 0 The
criticism is probably well deserved; the main point of contention in
cases such as these is whether further imprisonment will force the
contemnor to comply. A balancing of the court's interest in having
the recalcitrant party comply colors the civil contempt sentence with
a punitive hue."'
Courts are free to take into consideration any number of factors. The trial court in Dr. Morgan's case took into account the possibility that Morgan's friends and supporters might desert her, the
possibility that Morgan would realize the waste of her professional
talents," 2 and the probability that she would miss her child." 3
Courts must make determinations on a case by case basis," 4 and the
number of factors to be utilized in coming to a decision are limited
only by the facts surrounding each case.
The question of who bears the burden of proof in a case such as
Morgan's is an important question. Some courts fail to address the
issue." 5 Most courts state that the burden is properly on the contemnor, but fail to state why."' The court in King reasoned that because
the law presumes that one is capable of performing actions required
by the court, the inability to comply is an affirmative defense." 7 The
contemnor has both the burden of production as well as the burden
of persuasion."'
109. Id.
110. Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d I, 5 n.2 (D.C. 1989).
11i.
The Morgan IV court recognized that the ultimate issue in child custody or visitation proceedings is the child's best interests. In contempt cases such as Morgan's, however, the
overriding concern is the contemnor's due process rights. Morgan IV, 564 A.2d at 2.
112. Before being incarcerated, Morgan had a successful plastic surgery practice. She
also authored four books, including one on her earlier custody battles. New York Times, May
21, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, col. i. Morgan was also a contributing columnist for Cosmopolitan Magazine. Crook, Elizabeth Morgan: A Mother Against the System, COSMOPOLITAN,
Oct. 1989, at 239.
113. Morgan IV, 564 A.2d at 4.
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
115. See In re Crededio, 759 F. Supp. 589 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp.
179 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
116. See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1979); Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87,
91 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d
1303, 1310 (1988).
118. Id.
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D. Standard of Review
The question of what standard of review a court should apply is
an important one in civil contempt cases. Not all appellate courts
have been careful to discuss the standards for reviewing lower court
rulings on the effect of prolonged incarceration on civil contemnors;
some fail to mention it at all. 11 9
There are indications that the standard of review may differ
among jurisdictions, depending on whether there is a legislatively
mandated maximum period of incarceration for civil contemnors.
Prior to the District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment
Limitation Act of 1989, two states had placed caps on the amount of
time a civil contemnor may be held in custody: Wisconsin has a
maximum sentence of six months,1 20 and California's limit is twelve
months. 12 In addition, Congress has limited the civil contempt
power regarding witnesses who refuse to cooperate with federal
grand juries. In this context, federal law limits civil contempt
sentences for witnesses refusing to testify to eighteen months or the
life of the grand jury, whichever is shorter.12 2 There are no reported
cases from Wisconsin or California directly on point since the enactment of their statutes limiting civil contempt. Federal courts, however, have repeatedly asserted that the problem concerning standards
12 3
of review is ameliorated by the presence of the federal statute.
These courts have reasoned that Congress, by setting a limit of eighteen months imprisonment, has attempted to resolve the problem of
distinguishing between coercion and punishment. Federal courts
have therefore adopted an abuse of discretion standard for periods
shorter than eighteen months. 2 4 Courts are reluctant to draw "finer
119. Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1989).
120. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 785.04 (West 1981).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19(a) (Deering 1989). Three other states have set a maximum
period of confinement for civil contempt, but only in limited circumstances. In West Virginia,
a civil contempt sentence may not exceed six months in cases of divorce, annulment, and separate maintenance. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-22 (1989). New Jersey has set an eighteen month limit
on civil contempt sentences for individuals who refuse to answer questions or produce evidence
before the State Athletic Control Board. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:2A-10 (West 1985). In Pennsylvania, incarceration for civil contempt resulting from a failure to comply with an order concerning property settlement, or enforcing payment of arrearages in divorce cases, is limited to
six months. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 401(k)(6), 503 (Purdon 1989).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1982).
123. See Sanchez v. United States, 725 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984); Simkin v. United
States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983)); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d
420, 425 (3d Cir. 1979).
124. Sanchez, 725 F.2d at 31; Simkin, 715 F.2d at 37; Grand Jury Investigation
(Braun), 600 F.2d at 425; In re Parrish, 785 F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1986).
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lines than Congress has already drawn," 2

5

and at least one appellate

court has found lower court rulings to be "virtually unreviewable."

2

A court cannot, however, abdicate its responsibilities under the Con-

stitution simply because the legislature has acted in a particular
area,12 7 and some courts seem willing to loosen the standard if "unusual circumstances" exist. 1 8 There is a general agreement, however, that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether
a civil contempt sanction has lost its coercive effect upon an individual at some point prior to the maximum time. 29
There remains some confusion as to the applicable standard of
review for courts that are not faced with a statutory ceiling on civil
contempt. Without giving an explanation, at least one court has relied on the federal cases and adopted an abuse of discretion standard. 80 Although the opinion was vacated, the majority in Morgan
IV was critical of the way courts have dealt with their standards of
review, particularly when not confronted with a statutory maximum.' The Morgan IV court would not settle for a "virtually unreviewable" exercise of trial court discretion when the issue of due process was implicated. 8 2 The majority reasoned that broad trial court
discretion implied the "right to be wrong without incurring reversal."' 8 8 Therefore, under an abuse of discretion standard, a lower
125. Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d at 427.
126. Simkin, 715 F.2d at 38.
127. See Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d at 427.
128. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1979). The
court held, "We are reluctant to conclude, in the absence of unusual circumstances, that, as a
matter cognizable under due process, confinement for civil contempt that has not yet reached
the eighteen-month limit has nonetheless lost its coercive impact and become punitive." Id. An
example of "unusual circumstances" would be one in which a business associate of the contemnor, who is in the same. situation, finally gives in and testifies, but is immediately murdered or
maimed. Id.
129. In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1985); Sanchez v. United States, 725
F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); In re
Dohrn, 560 F. Supp. 179, 189 (S.D. N.Y. 1983); In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 859, 864 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978). In Sanchez, the lower court erroneously concluded that, [absent unusual circumstances] it "should not" make a finding that a civil contempt confinement has become punitive
before the eighteen month period. The Court of Appeals remanded the matter because a court
should be reluctant to conclude as a matter of due process that a civil contempt sanction has
lost its coercive effect prior to the maximum period. The task of the trial court is different. The
court held that even though Congress specified a maximum period of confinement for a particular contemnor, the issue of whether the confinement of that contemnor has ceased to be
coercive before the maximum period "requires no showing of grounds for disagreeing with
Congress, but only grounds for finding that no realistic possibility exists that the contemnor
might yet testify if confinement is continued." Sanchez, 725 F.2d at 31.
130. King v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d
1303, 1310 (1988).
131. The decision in Morgan IV was reached before Congress acted.
132. Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1989).
133. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 367 (D.C. 1979)).
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court's ruling does not have to be unquestionably correct to be upheld, it just cannot be "demonstrably incorrect."'"" The court
concluded,
Our review of an alleged violation of due process cannot tolerate
a range of acceptable results, including one or more that may be
"wrong." As to constitutional issues, therefore, we review for
trial court error (with appropriate deference to the trial court's
fact-finding role) with a view to "only one possible outcome."' 1 5
This rationale is especially persuasive for courts not confronted with
a maximum period of time a person may be held in civil contempt.
There is no reason, however, to refrain from applying this reasoning
in jurisdictions with legislatively set maximum sentences. Appellate
courts are not granted the power to hear witnesses testify so as to
ascertain their veracity. Thus, reviewing courts should accord lower
courts due deference on factual issues such as whether there is any
substantial likelihood that the contemnor will comply. When due
process concerns are raised, however, the courts should draw the line
and make the appropriate decision. Legislatures are not given constitutional authority to define due process.
E.

Periodic Hearings

Courts disagree on the issue of when, if ever, a lower court must
grant motions for a hearing to determine if there is no substantial
likelihood that continued confinement will accomplish its coercive
purpose. Some courts have held that it is necessary for lower courts
to grant periodic reviews to prevent a civil contempt sanction from
becoming a life sentence. " 6 Other courts have held that while an
evidentiary hearing is often helpful, it is not an abuse of discretion
for a trial court to decline to grant a hearing. 3 7 Without such an
evidentiary hearing, it would be difficult if not impossible to ascertain whether there is the likelihood of compliance in the future.
Courts should be more receptive to holding periodic hearings at the
contemnor's request. Preferably, courts should be forced by legislative mandate to hold such hearings. 3 8
134.
135.
136.
Social &
137.
138.

Morgan IV, 564 A.2d at 6.
Id. at 6-7 (quoting Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915, 920 (D.C. 1986)).
Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); King v. Department of
Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1988).
In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 1979).
See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
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IV.

Congress to the Rescue

After the decision in Morgan IV was vacated for a rehearing en
banc, the full Court of Appeals .heard oral arguments on the fate of
Dr. Morgan. The arguments were rendered moot, however, and a
decision was never reached because Congress, in an extraordinary
move, decided the fate of Dr. Morgan before the judicial process was
completed. Under the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, the
D.C. Council is prohibited from passing legislation concerning the
district's court system.' 3 9 District judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Congress is given sole power to
amend the system. The District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989140 [the Act] amended the District of
Columbia Code sections concerning contempt.14 1 The ' Act was
whisked through Congress at a speed normally reserved for wartime
2
or economic emergencies.1
Among other things, the Act limited to twelve months the
amount of time an individual can be imprisoned on civil contempt
charges arising out of a child custody proceeding.14 The Act applied
retroactively, thereby freeing Dr. Morgan. Congress's action was
hailed by many organizations,' 4 4 but the flurry of public support did
not suppress the criticisms by some lonely dissenters. 4
139.
140.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2 33(a)(4) (1981).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (1981 & Supp. 1990).

141.

D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-944, 11-721 (1981).

142.
col. 1.
143.
144.

See Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1989, at Al,

See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.) lists the following as groups supporting the act:
- National Network for Victims of Sexual Assault;
- Family Research Council;
- The National Organization for Women;
- Prison Fellowship;
- The Baltimore Sun;.
- The Journal Newspapers.
CONG REc. H3244 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Wolf).
145. In addition to criticism by District of Columbia judges, see supra note 25 and

accompanying text, the Washington Post had "serious misgivings" about the new law. The
Post editorial questioned the prudence of congressional wisdom of setting blanket statutory
limits on the civil contempt power. Washington Post, Aug. 31, 1989, at A26 (editorial), col. I.
See also infra note 215 and accompanying text concerning statutory limits for civil contempt
imprisonment.
The Post also shared the misgivings of the American Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU
opposed outright statutory limits because they may send a "'message that obedience to the
court's order is not really required, but is simply an option to be balanced against the alternative option of one year of incarceration.'" Washington Post, Aug. 31, 1989, at A26 (editorial),
col. 1.See also infra note 216 and accompanying text for further criticism of the Act by the
ACLU.
Goldfarb, who has even suggested the abolition of civil contempt, see GOLDFARB, supra
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Although Congressional action on behalf of Dr. Morgan drew
wide public support, the implications of that action are disturbing
both for policy reasons and for the changes it made in the substantive law of contempt. While Congress's action can be criticized in
many respects, there is a silver lining in the cloud: the Morgan cases
brought the problems of civil contempt to the attention of Congress
as well as the public.
A.

Impetus for Congressional Action

The impetus for Congress to act came from a strange and ironic
set of alliances. It is not often, for example, that the National Organization for Women allies itself with conservative congressional
leaders such as Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.) and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)."'"
Although Morgan had been in jail since 1987, it was not until
1988 that the national media took an interest in the story. In March
of that year, Alice Monroe, a speech pathologist who worked in the
same hospital as Morgan, formed a group called "The Friends of
Elizabeth Morgan" (FOEM). 47 FOEM began to hold candlelight
vigils outside the detention center where Morgan was being held. 4 8
About the same time, Charles Colson took notice of the case. A
convicted felon who spent time in prison for obstruction of justice in
the Watergate scandal, Colson is the founder of the Prison Fellowship Ministries, a Christian group that publishes a newsletter entitled "Jubilee." 14 9 Representative Frank Wolf, a friend of Colson's
who is on the mailing list for "Jubilee," received a copy of the newsletter containing an article on the plight of Dr. Morgan. 50 Moved by
the story, Wolf drafted a bill to free Dr. Morgan.' 5' In the
meantime, H. Ross Perot, a Texas billionaire, took notice of the
Morgan case and began to call and write key senators.15 2 Former
note 36, at 292, was also critical of the Act, but for different reasons. Goldfarb characterized
the Morgan case as a "classic example of an instructive cliche: hard cases make bad law."
Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1989, at A15, col. 1.Goldfarb argued that the new law did not go
far enough. He believes that after six months, the coercive effect of imprisonment ceases, and
the imprisoned individual should be prosecuted for "more serious criminal charges . . . [if]
appropriate," with all the constitutional protections mandated in criminal cases. Washington
Post, Oct. 2, 1989, at A15, col. 4.
146. See Washington Times, March 1, 1990, at Fl, col. 1.
147. Washington Times, Oct. 17, 1989, at A5, col. 2.
148. Id.
149. Newsday, July 31, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
150. Id.
151. H.R. 2136, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
152. Newsday, July 31, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
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Democratic National Chairman Robert Strauss also played a important role in the Senate lobbying effort. 153 All this prompted Senator
15 4
Orrin Hatch to sponsor the Senate version of the House Bill.
B.

Key Provisions of the Act

The House Committee on the District of Columbia stated in its
Report that the purpose of the Bill was to amend the District of
Columbia Code regarding contempt. 155 The Report also stated that
although the amendments would affect Morgan's incarceration, it
was not intended to provide a per se legislative remedy for her. 15"
Instead, the Report declared that the Act was modeled after the
California and Wisconsin statutes limiting civil contempt.15
As originally drafted, Wolf's Bill sought to limit to eighteen
months the time a person can be imprisoned for civil contempt cases
arising out of child custody disputes in the District's courts.158 At
subcommittee mark-up, however, an amendment was passed reducing the maximum time limit to twelve months. The amendment also
made the Bill applicable to all cases of civil contempt rather than
just child custody cases.15 9
The final version of the House Bill as reported out by the Committee contained some important exceptions to the twelve month
limit. The Bill did not affect the time an individual can be sentenced
for criminal contempt. Presumably, Morgan can still be prosecuted
for criminal contempt or for other charges if she returns to the
United States. 6 0 An exception to the twelve month limit applied
when a trial was pending on criminal contempt charges. 61 A civil
contemnor involved in a pending criminal contempt trial could have
been imprisoned until the completion of the trial. In no case, however, could the contemnor have been imprisoned longer than eighteen months for the civil contempt charge.16 2 An individual already
imprisoned for civil contempt could be prosecuted for criminal contempt before the end of the twelve month period, but no earlier than
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
S. 1163, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
H.R. REP. No. 98, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989).
Id. See also infra note 188 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. No. 98, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989).
Id.
See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
H.R. 2136, 101st Cong., IstSess., 135 CONG. REc. H3240-41 (1989).
Id.
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six months after being incarcerated."' The Bill also provided that
any individual already imprisoned for civil contempt on the date of
enactment could be prosecuted for criminal contempt at any time
during the ninety-day period beginning on the date of enactment.
The House Bill also mandated that any criminal contempt trial
in a situation such as Dr. Morgan's had to begin within ninety days
of the charge being instituted. 64 The court had to allow a trial by
jury if the individual requests. There was no requirement that a sentence be longer than six months for the defendant to obtain a jury
trial."' Hence, the defendant would be afforded a jury trial, even if
the judge had a one week sentence in mind. Furthermore, the criminal contempt trial could not be before the same judge that originally
imprisoned the individual for civil contempt.' 66 This was a prudent
provision, aimed at avoiding any bias on the part of the judge who
has been repeatedly rebutted by that contemnor in the past.
Some Committee members were concerned that because the Bill
did not expressly provide for retroactivity, Dr. Morgan could not be
released by it.' 67 The Committee Report, however, clearly stated
that there was a consensus among the members that the bill had a
retroactive effect and would free Dr. Morgan. 6
The Committee on the District of Columbia subsequently reported the Bill out for the full House to debate and vote on it. On
June 28, 1989, the House approved the Bill by a vote of 376 to 34,
with 22 members not voting.1 69
The Senate's version of the Bill had a number of significant differences. First, the Senate's version did not have as broad a scope as
the House version. The Senate adopted Senator Hatch's strongly expressed preference that the Bill be limited to only child custody proceedings, and not apply to all civil contemnors.7 0 The Senate's version also contained an expedited appeal procedure.17 ' According to
this procedure, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had to
hear an appeal from an order of the Superior Court holding an indi163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
166. H.R. 2136, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H3240-41 (1981).
167. H.R. REP. No. 98, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 3-4 (1989).
168. Id.
169. 135 CONG. REC. H3262 (daily ed. June 28, 1989).
170. 135 CONG. REC. S10810 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989). Senator Sasser, a proponent of
the Bill professed that although issues of due process and dissipation of coercive power are
present in any case in which a civil contemnor steadfastly refuses to comply, Congress "need
not legislate with an eye to every hypothetical case." Id.
171. S. 1163, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REC. S10809 (1989).
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vidual in contempt in a custody case no later than sixty days after a

contemnor requests an appeal.17 2 The Bill also contained an explicit
provision making it retroactive to January 1, 1987.'~
Because of the speed and manner with which the Bill was
brought to the Senate floor, some Senators expressed concern that
not enough attention was devoted to the subject.' 74 During the debates, Senator Mitchell sponsored an amendment to the Bill containing two important changes. Mitchell first suggested to "sunset" the
Bill after eighteen months; this meant that the bill would be rendered ineffective eighteen months after enactment. 175 Mitchell's
amendment also mandated the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the Judiciary Committee to conduct a study on the law of
civil contempt in the District of Columbia and in the federal courts
and to make recommendations to the Senate by September 1,
1990.176 That same day, the Bill, which included Senator Mitchell's
amendment, was unanimously approved.
An interesting question arose during Congressional debates on
both versions of the Bill: after Morgan's release, could she be hailed
into court the next day, asked once again to disclose the location of
the child, and then be sent back to prison for twelve months if she
refused to obey? Representative Durban played the Devil's advocate:
If I represented [Foretich] I would file a petition in the District

of Columbia the next day, asking [Morgan] to disclose again
where that child is, and if she fails to do so, she may
find herself
back in the cell again for another twelve months. 177
Neither Bill, nor the final Act, explicitly stated that such an action
was precluded. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
however, recognized the loophole in its Report and suggested that if
the substance of the order giving rise to civil contempt remained unchanged, repeated imprisonments of an individual for successive
78
twelve month periods was prohibited.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See 135 CONG. REC. S10811 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin).
Professor Doug Rendleman who testified before a House Subcommittee Hearing noted that
"(sjome of the witnesses at the hearing and members of Congress didn't understand what the
hell was going on." He tempered his statement by saying, "That is no reflection on them. The
law is extremely technical and hard to sort out." The National Law Journal, Oct. 30, 1989, at
42, col. 2.
175. 135 CONG. REc. S10811 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin).
176. Id.
177. 135 CONG. REC. H3248 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Durban).
178. S. REP. No. 104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989). Although there was nothing
explicit in the final Act on this point, courts usually place great weight on Committee Reports
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The District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989 was signed into law on September 23, 1989. The
Act contained the Senate provision that it would only affect civil
contemnors in cases arising out of custody disputes.1 79 Also, under
the Act, the contemnor could be imprisoned for a maximum of
twelve months on a civil contempt charge unless criminal contempt
charges were brought between the sixth and twelfth month. In no
instance, however, could the contemnor be incarcerated for more
than eighteen months.18 0
The Act incorporated the exact provisions of both the House
and Senate Bills regarding criminal contempt: the limits did not apply to criminal contemnors; the criminal contempt trial had to begin
within ninety days of the charge; trial was to be before a jury if
requested; and the trial could not be by the same judge who impris-

oned the individual for civil contempt. 181
The Act also retained the Senate Bill's provisions that any appeals taken must be heard no later than sixty days after an appeal is

requested, 8 ' and the law was to "sunset" after eighteen months.'

In addition, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, together with the House Committee on the District of Columbia were

required to conduct a study on the law of civil contempt. 8 4 The Senwhen interpreting legislation. F.CUMMINGS, CAPITOL HILL MANUAL 53 (1976). See, e.g. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("IT]he authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed
legislation.' ") (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
179. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The law, therefore, was rendered ineffective on March 23, 1991.
184. After reviewing the law of civil contempt in the District of Columbia, the Senate
-Governmental Affairs Committee and the House Committee on the District of Columbia
concluded:
The Committee has found no evidence that there is an on-going problem with
incarceration for civil contempt generally in the District of Columbia. There is
no evidence that judges are abusing their power to confine contemnors, and the
average sentence served by civil contemnors who are confined is only 12 days.
Thus, there appears to be no justification for expanding the Act's coverage.
SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMM. TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CIVIL CONTEMPT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT, S. Doc. No.

554, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990).
The Committees did, however, recognize the potential for some civil contemnors to be
significantly deprived of liberty without the full range of procedural safeguards that apply in
criminal cases. The Committees, therefore, recommended the following:
(1) expedited appeals for individuals held in civil contempt in all types of cases
(not just child custody cases); (2) plenary review on appeal of civil contempt
cases; (3) appointed counsel for indigents at civil contempt hearings; and (4)
periodic review of sanctions for civil contempt by the court that imposed them to
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ate Committee on the judiciary was also required to submit a report
on civil contempt in the federal courts. 85
C. Critique of the Act
While the impetus for Congress to intervene was a result of the
good intentions of influential citizens and politicians, Congressional
interference in this emotional affair set a dangerous precedent and
was a matter of bad policy. The Act did nothing to help the plight of
an innocent child deprived of both parents, as many members of
Congress stressed it would.""8 In addition, it opened up the Senate to
87
a charge of hypocrisy.
It cannot be said that this law was anything but a private relief
bill to free Dr. Morgan. Her case was the impetus for action, and the
Act was so narrowly tailored that it was inconceivable that it would
affect anyone but her. Senator Hatch claimed that, "[w]hile the specific need for this bill is illustrated by the plight of Dr. Elizabeth
Morgan, and while the bill would free her, it is emphatically not for
her benefit alone. This is not a private bill, but a bill of general application." 8 8 If this is so, why did it apply only to child custody
cases? Why was it retroactive? And why did it contain a sunset
provision?
No Constitutional prohibition exists against passing private legislation so long as it is not classified as a bill of attainder. 89 In the
context of this case, however, the private law set a bad precedent
and ultimately damaged the integrity of Congress. In Congress, legislation is usually passed as a matter of general policy, for masses of
people, not for a determined mother banished to the jail cells of a
detention center. Once it is done in this case, could the members of
Congress resist taking on the task of intervening in other sympathetic cases that are pleaded before them? Some members think not;
instead, they feel they are on the verge of the proverbial "slippery
ensure that they are still appropriate.
Id. at 10.
185. The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that in the federal courts, no problems
with civil contempt exist, and that any change in current federal law is unnecessary. SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON CIVIL CONTEMPT IN FEDERAL COURTS. S. Doc. No. 432,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
186. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
188. 135 CONG. REC. S10811 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch). See
also 135 CONG. REC. S10814 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) ("1 would not want this to pass with
somebody thinking this is a private relief bill. It is not anything of the kind. It is a bill of
general application ....") (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
189. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 473 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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slope." 9
Even if Congress were to act in this manner from time to time,
it would assuredly benefit only the affluent and powerful. It is doubtful that Congress would have come to the rescue of an indigent woman from the ghetto. The case of Baltimore City Department of
Social Services v. Bouknight'9 ' provides a good example. In
Bouknight, Jacqueline Bouknight was suspected of physically abusing her infant child. 1 92 The Baltimore City Department of Social

Services was notified and secured a court order to remove the child
from Bouknight's control.1 98 Despite Bouknight's history of drug
abuse, the order was later modified to return the child to Bouknight's
custody.1 94 Because Bouknight would not cooperate, the Department
of Social Services petitioned the court again to remove the child
from the home.'95 Bouknight had given conflicting reports to the Department concerning the child's location and the Department feared
the child was missing and perhaps dead.' 96 When Bouknight declined to produce the child, she was found in contempt and was imprisoned.1 97 The underlying concern of the case was that the child

may be dead, and that Bouknight was responsible.
Bouknight attempted to quash the contempt order on fifth
amendment grounds, claiming that revealing the location of the child
might tend to incriminate her."9 The trial court rejected her argument but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
public's right to protect children does not outweigh a mother's constitutional right against self-incrimination. 9 9 The United States Supreme Court heard an emergency appeal and ordered Bouknight's
incarceration for civil contempt to continue until it heard arguments
on the case.20 0 After full consideration of the case, the Supreme

Court reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals decision.2 0 '
190. One Senator put it this way: "After passing this law, will we be able to say no to
someone else who comes along and has an equally compelling case? I doubt it." 135 CONG.
REC. S10816 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
191. Baltimore City Dep't. of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, 110 S.Ct. 900 (1990).
192. Id. at 903. Bouknight's child was hospitalized with a fractured leg. In the hospital,
Bouknight was observed shaking the child, dropping him in his crib, "and otherwise handling
him in a manner inconsistent with his recovery and continued health." Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Baltimore City Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, I10 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 401, 550 A.2d 1135, 1144-45 (1988).
200. Baltimore City Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, 109 S.Ct. 571 (1988).
201. Baltimore City Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, I10 S. Ct. 900 (1990). The
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Bouknight's imprisonment began in April, 1988, and she is still
in jail at this date. If Bouknight's actions took place only thirty miles
south of where they did, it is unlikely that there would have been
such a clamor in Congress to expedite a new law to limit civil contempt. Not only would Congress not have acted on a less sympathetic case such as Bouknight's, but that case should be looked upon
as one of the pitfalls of placing an outright cap on imprisonment for
2 02
civil contempt.
Congress's actions infuriated many District of Columbia judges
who fiercly (but anonymously) criticized the Act.203 Such criticism is
justified in light of the fact that Congress interfered with an on-going case before the Court of Appeals. In effect, Congress overruled
the courts and freed Morgan before her judicial remedies were exhausted. As one Senator put it, "it is inconsistent with the Senate's
proper legislative role for it to become a court of appeal for disappointed litigants, whether in the Morgan case or any other. ' 20 Congressional action in this case was not only damaging to Congress's
relationship with the judiciary but it also tends to politicize the judicial system. It is simply not sound policy for a legislative body to
intrude in an on-going judicial case.
In passing a law to limit civil contempt in the District of Columbia, the Senate opened itself up to a charge of hypocrisy. Under
current law, the Senate has the power to cite individuals for civil
contempt if they refuse to testify at hearings.20° This power is not
tempered by a limit on the amount of time a person can be incarcerated. As Senator Mitchell pointed out, the Senate is currently holding William Borders in contempt for refusing to testify in the imCourt held that "Bouknight may not invoke the [fifth amendment] privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production [of the child] and
because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime." Id. at 905.
The court in Morgan IV held that the issue involved in Bouknight was inapposite to Morgan's case because Morgan had not asserted a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a reason for not complying with the court order. Also, Bouknight challenged her
initial incarceration for civil contempt, a distinctly different issue. Morgan v. Foretich (Morgan IV), 564 A.2d 1, 36 (D.C. 1989).
202. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
204. 135 CONG. REC. S10815 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Danforth).

Senator Mitchell stated that
[d]ifficult as this case may be, unfair as the result may seem, it is extremely
unwise for the Congress to interfere in this way with the judicial branch of government, especially with a bill to affect a specific case now pending in the courts
and right in the middle of litigation.
135 CONG. REC. S10818 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. 1 1987).
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peachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings.20 6 And in 1981, William
Cammissano was held in contempt for nearly eighteen months for
refusing to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations.20 7 The Senate has subjected the District's judges to a limitation on enforcing their orders while Senator's retain the prerogative
to hold civil contemnors well beyond the twelve month maximum
imposed on the District of Columbia courts.
Perhaps one of the biggest fallacies during Congress's debates
was the widespread belief of the members that passage of the Act

would actually assist in bringing Morgan's child home from "extradition. 20 8 Senator Hatch stated that "[t]he important thing to remember is that the child is deprived of both parents . . . Hilary is
left without a patent. I think it is time for us to do something about
it." 20 9 The Senator's rhetoric is appealing but unfortunately meritless."' The Act simply addressed the amount of time a civil contem-

nor can remain imprisoned, it did not affect the underlying court
order compelling Morgan to produce the child. Issues of civil con-

tempt and the contemnor's due process rights are important and are
in need of legislative overhaul.2 1 The only viable solution to solving
the problem of parents secreting their children in these situations is
to attack the problem at its root. Legislatures need to address the
problems of proving sexual abuse charges in the courts, or provide an
alternative avenue to the use of civil contempt in cases of child custody battles. 12 The District of Columbia's Act simply did not address these problems.
Aside from being a private bill for the benefit of Dr. Morgan,
the Act raised another important issue: to what extent should the
legislature limit the ability of the judiciary to enforce its valid de206. 135 CONG. REC. S10818 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
207. Id.
208. Morgan referred to Hilary's absence as Hilary's being in a "foster home of her
choice." Washington Post, Sept. 27, 1989, at D4, col. 1.
209. 135 CONG. REC. S10819 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch, in defending, the reason why his Bill only applies to child custody cases reasoned,
..we single out custody because the helpless child is the real loser in such cases, deprived
indefinitely of both parents. The case for limiting the court's summary contempt power is
strongest here." 135 CONG. REC. S10811 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
This logic is rather specious when one considers the fact that passage of the Act did nothing to
change the underlying court order.
210. It seems that the Senator's statement is rhetoric only. When Foretich's lawyer,
Elaine Mittleman, asked about finding Hilary, Hatch replied, "That's not something you can
expect the Congress of the United States to do." Newsday, Sept. 7, 1989, at 8, col. I.
211. See infra § V.
212. See Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond
Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491 (1989) (suggesting that a necessity defense to contempt
should be available to civil contemnors).

CIVIL CONTEMPT AND CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE

crees? Senator Hatch stated, "My bill simply recognizes that after
one year, continued imprisonment of a protective parent constitutes
punishment, not persuasion." 13 The court system may be slow to
determine when coercion ends and punishment begins, but some serious implications result from imposing a maximum cap on civil contempt sentences.
Judge Maxwell Davison of the Lehigh County Common Pleas
Court in Allentown, Pennsylvania noted that situations such as Morgan's are rare and only arise when there is an extreme set of circumstances. 2" ' Placing an outright cap on civil contempt sentences creates a light at the end of the tunnel for the unhappy litigant who
refuses to comply with a court order. A cap would not only benefit
contemnors such as Morgan when no amount of coercion will force
compliance, but it would also benefit others who would essentially be
given a choice between complying with a court order or spending a
predetermined time in jail. The thought of an indeterminate stay behind bars is often a strong factor in persuading unhappy litigants to
comply. Senator Danforth noted that "[ilt is the very indeterminacy
of imprisonment that enables the court to achieve the behavior it
seeks. Eliminate the indeterminacy, and the incentive to comply is
weakened. 215 Establishing an outright maximum presents civil contemnors with a choice when none existed before. The contemnor can
either comply with the order or remain imprisoned for a specified
period of time. Granted, the thought of spending time behind bars is
not a happy one for most, but establishing a maximum sentence
would benefit the adamant or vindictive party.
To the surprise of some, the American Civil Liberties Union
was publicly opposed to passage of the Act. The ACLU reasoned
that the civil contempt power is a powerful tool in a judge's arsenal
to protect the rights of political and racial minorities, and that placing limits on that power would hurt the cause of civil liberties.2"6 To
the delight of many, passage of the Act represented a victory for
those who viewed Morgan's case as sympathetic and unjust, but the
potential dangers should also be considered. The Bouknight case is
an example. Had Bouknight benefited from this type of legislation,
she would have been released and the State would have minimal evidence to produce in a criminal case against her. The problem would
213. 135 CONG. REc. S10812 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
214. The National Law Journal, Oct. 30, 1989, at 42, col. 3.
215. 135 CONG. REc. S10816 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
216. As an alternative, the ACLU proposes an "expeditious and searching" review by
appellate courts. Legal Times, Sept. 7, 1989, at 3. See also supra note 145.
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also apply to fathers who refuse to pay child support. The father
would simply have a choice of either spending a predetermined
amount of time in jail or paying substantial support for the next
eighteen years.
V. Recommendations
The convoluted and complex law of civil contempt is in dire
need of legislative overhaul. The courts and legislatures face the
problem of striking an appropriate balance. Ensuring the due process
rights of those held in civil contempt must be balanced against ensuring the rights of the party hoping to reap the benefits of a court
order. These interests must also be balanced against judges' interest
in having effective means to enforce their orders. The judicial process is too slow and the test for determining when a contemnor can
no longer be coerced is difficult to apply. On the other hand, a legislative cap on civil contempt sentences is an over-encompassing solution fraught with numerous pitfalls.
A compromise solution would keep the judicial branch supreme
in deciding when a civil contemnor must be released, but it should be
improved through legislative mandate. Instead of placing an outright
cap on civil contempt sentences, the rights of all interested parties
would be better served if there was a statutory presumption that after six or twelve months, further incarceration will not gain compliance. In other words, after a certain amount of time, there would
exist a presumption that the coercive impact of civil contempt has
ceased and that the imprisonment has become a punishment. An individual contemplating compliance with a court order would no
longer have an established maximum sentence to balance against
complying. Faced with an indeterminable jail sentence, the contemnor would be more likely to comply with the court order.
Once the statutory presumption is reached, the burden of persuasion should shift to the party who would benefit from compliance.
The initial burden of production should remain with the contemnor.
At this point, the rationale of King v. Department of Social &

Health Services is no longer valid. The law no longer presumes that
a party will perform actions required by the court; 17 therefore, the
burden of persuading the court that there is a substantial likelihood
of compliance should be on the opposing party.
In drafting civil contempt laws, legislators should consider im217.

See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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posing on judges a duty to allow periodic reviews of the status of the
civil contemnor.2 18 If requested, contemnors should be granted full
evidentiary hearings at perhaps three month intervals. Before the
end of the statutory presumption period, the contemnor should carry
the burden of proving that further imprisonment will not force compliance. As noted above, once the presumption arises that further
imprisonment is punitive, the burden should shift to the opposing
party. Full evidentiary hearings at regular intervals would give the
contemnor a chance to present his or her story as well as provide
assurances that the contemnor would not be imprisoned
indefinitely. 9
At least two provisions of the District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act were insightful and should be
incorporated into future legislation. The trial of an individual prosecuted for criminal contempt should be heard before a different judge
than the one who imprisoned the contemnor for civil contempt. 2 In
the same respect, when a contemnor requests a hearing to determine
if compliance can be gained by further incarceration, that hearing
should not be held by the same judge who imposed the underlying
order. This requirement would prevent a judge's personal pride from
becoming an obstacle to the resolution of an issue that is separated
from the issue of the underlying order. Judges understandably have
a great interest, both on a personal level and a professional level, in
seeing their orders obeyed.
Similarly, the mandatory sixty-day appeal provision was a positive aspect of the Act. 2 Once the presumptive period has commenced, appellate courts should be required to hear arguments
within sixty days on appeals taken from a denial of the civil contemnor's motion to be released. Although appellate courts should give
due deference to the factual findings of the trial court, they should
approach the constitutional issue of due process with a view to "only
one possible outcome. ' 222 Therefore, the reviewing court should review de novo a lower court's ultimate conclusion.22 3
Finally, these reforms should apply to all civil contempt actions,
218. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text.
219. At the very least, the court should be required to hold a hearing at the end of the
six or twelve month period that gives rise to a presumption of punishment.
220. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
221. Id.
222. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
223. See United States v. Castillo, 844 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988) (appellate court
should review de novo the ultimate conclusion on the constitutional issue of the validity of a
warrantless search).
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not only those that arise out of a custody battle. There is no legal
justification for applying a limit or presumption to only custody
cases. As Senator Rudman remarked, "it makes no legal sense to
assert that judges presiding in custody cases should have less power
to enforce their orders than judges in all other cases . .

,.".
As

mentioned earlier,2 5 tackling the problems of child sexual abuse and
parents hiding their children should be more proximately related to
the root of the problem. Limiting the scope of civil contempt in such
cases does nothing to solve that underlying problem.
VI.

Conclusion

Dr. Elizabeth Morgan's predicament exemplifies the need for
reform in the area of civil contempt. The courts have historically had
difficulty differentiating between civil and criminal contempt. And
for civil contemnors imprisoned for extremely long periods of time,
the wheels of justice grind slowly. It is a lengthy, complicated process for the courts to determine whether further imprisonment will
force compliance with the court's underlying order.
The adage that "hard cases make bad law" is an apt one in this
case. The law of civil contempt is in need of legislative reform, preferably without the pressure of a "hard" case. Although the Morgan
case and the resulting congressional reaction to it have produced
controversy, that controversy may be the impetus needed to push
through meaningful reform. Representative Wolf said, "If the sole
result of my bill is that [i]t sparks discussion which produces another
responsible solution to the controversy, I will have considered my effort a success. '226 In this sense, it was indeed a success.
Randal S. White

224.
225.
226.

The National Law Journal, Oct. 30, 1989, at 42, col. 2.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
135 CONG. REC. H3244 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Wolf).

